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Continuous-time integral dynamics for monotone
aggregative games with coupling constraints
Claudio De Persis and Sergio Grammatico
Abstract—We consider continuous-time equilibrium seeking
in monotone aggregative games with coupling constraints. We
propose semi-decentralized integral dynamics and prove their
global convergence to a variational generalized aggregative or
Nash equilibrium. The proof is based on Lyapunov arguments
and invariance techniques for differential inclusions.
Index Terms—Aggregative game theory, Multi-agent systems,
Decentralized control, Projected dynamical systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Aggregative game theory [2] is a mathematical framework
to model inter-dependent optimal decision making problems
for a set of noncooperative agents, where the decision of each
agent is affected by some aggregate effect of all the agents.
Motivated by application domains where this aggregative
feature arises, e.g. demand side management [3] and network
congestion control, equilibrium seeking in aggregative games
is currently an active research area.
Existence and uniqueness of (Nash) equilibria in (aggrega-
tive) games has been comprehensively studied, especially in
close connection with variational inequalities [4], [5, §12].
Distributed and semi-decentralized algorithms [6], [7], [8],
[9], [10] have been proposed as discrete-time dynamics that
converge to an equilibrium of the game, e.g. Nash or aggrega-
tive equilibrium, under appropriate technical assumptions and
sufficient conditions on the problem data. Specifically, one can
characterize the desired equilibria as the zeros of a monotone
operator, e.g. via the concatenation of interdependent Karush–
Kuhn–Tucker operators, and formulate an equivalent fixed-
point problem, to be solved via discrete-time dynamics with
guaranteed global asymptotic convergence [9], [10].
Within the literature on equilibrium seeking for aggregative
games with coupling constraints, the available solution meth-
ods are algorithms in discrete time, where tuning the step size
is typically a hard task. Therefore, in this paper, we address the
aggregative equilibrium computation problem via continuous-
time dynamics. Inspired by passivity arguments [11], our
original contribution is to provide simple, primal-dual integral
dynamics for the computation of generalized aggregative and
Nash equilibria via semi-decentralized dynamics.
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To handle both local and global constraints, we propose
equilibrium seeking dynamics that are characterized as the dy-
namics of a projected dynamical system [12], whose solutions
are intended as locally absolutely continuous functions. Thus,
we exploit invariance arguments for differential inclusions
with maximally monotone set-valued right-hand side, and
apply it to our primal-dual projected dynamics [13], [14]. From
the technical perspective, our main contribution is to prove
global asymptotic convergence of the proposed dynamics to a
generalized (primal-dual) equilibrium of the aggregative game,
under mild assumptions on the problem data, namely, local
convexity of cost functions, convexity of constraints, and strict
monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient mapping. Compared to
our preliminary contribution [1], in this paper, we consider
aggregative games with coupling constraints, propose primal-
dual dynamics, and discuss convergence to both generalized
aggregative equilibria and generalized Nash equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce and math-
ematically characterize the problem setup in Section II. We
propose the equilibrium seeking dynamics and present the
main result in Section III. Technical discussions and corollaries
are in Section IV. The proofs are given in the Appendix.
Notation and definitions: 0 denotes a matrix/vector
with all elements equal to 0. ⊗ denotes the Kronecker
product. Given N vectors x1, . . . , xN ∈ Rn, we de-
fine x := col (x1, . . . , xN ) =
[
x⊤1 , . . . , x
⊤
N
]⊤
, x−i :=
col (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ), and avg(x) :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi.
Let the set S ⊆ Rn be non-empty. The symbol bdry(S)
denotes the boundary of S, and the mapping ιS : Rn →
{0, ∞} denotes the indicator function, i.e., ιS(x) = 0 if
x ∈ S, ∞ otherwise. The set-valued mapping NS : Rn ⇒
R
n denotes the normal cone operator, i.e., NS(x) = ∅ if
x /∈ S,
{
v ∈ Rn | supz∈S v
⊤(z − x) ≤ 0
}
otherwise. The
set-valued mapping TS : Rn ⇒ Rn denotes the tangent
cone operator. The mapping projS(·) := argminy∈S ‖y − ·‖ :
R
n → S denotes the projection operator; ΠS(x, v) :=
limh→0+
1
h
(projS(x+ hv)− x) denotes the projection of the
vector v ∈ Rn onto the tangent cone of S at x ∈ S, i.e.,
ΠS(x, ·) = projTS(x)(·). For a function f : R
n → R,
dom(f) := {x ∈ Rn | f(x) < ∞}; ∂f : dom(f) ⇒ Rn
denotes its subdifferential set-valued mapping, defined as
∂f(x) := {v ∈ Rn | f(z) ≥ f(x) + v⊤(z − x) for all z ∈
dom(f)}; if f is differentiable at x, then ∂f(x) = {∇f(x)}.
Given a closed convex set C ⊆ Rn and a single-valued
mapping F : C → Rn, the variational inequality problem,
denoted by VI(C,F ), is the problem to find x∗ ∈ C such that
infy∈C (y − x∗)⊤ F (x∗) ≥ 0.
II. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND: AGGREGATIVE GAMES
AND VARIATIONAL EQUILIBRIA
A. Jointly-convex aggregative games with coupling constraints
A jointly-convex aggregative game with coupling con-
straints is denoted by a triplet Gagg = (I, (Ji)i∈I , (Xi)i∈I),
where I := {1, . . . , N} is the index set of N decision makers,
or agents,
(
Ji : R
n × Rn → R
)
i∈I
is an ordered set of cost
functions and
(
Xi : Rn(N−1) ⇒ Rn
)
i∈I
is an ordered set of
set-valued mappings that represent coupled constraint sets. For
each i ∈ I, we assume an affine structure for the set Xi:
Xi(x−i) := {y ∈ Ωi | Aiy +
∑
j∈I\{i} Ajxj ≤ b} ,
for some set Ωi ⊆ Rn and matrices A1, . . . , AN ∈ Rm×n.
In aggregative games, the aim of each agent i ∈ I is
to minimize its objective function x 7→ J i(xi, avg(x)) that
depends on the local decision variable and on the average
among the decision variables of all agents, i.e., avg(x) :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi. Formally, a jointly-convex aggregative game with
coupling constraints represents the following collection of
inter-dependent optimization problems:
∀i ∈ I :
{
min
xi∈Ωi
Ji (xi, avg(x))
s.t. Ax− b ≤ 0 ,
(1)
where Ax := [A1, . . . , AN ]x = Aixi +
∑
j 6=i Ajxj .
Throughout the paper, we have the following assumption.
Standing Assumption 1: Continuity, compactness, convex-
ity. The objective functions {Ji}i∈I are continuous. The
sets {Ωi}i∈I are non-empty, compact and convex. The set
X := Ω∩{x ∈ RnN | Ax ≤ b}, where Ω := Ω1× . . .×ΩN ,
is non-empty and satisfies Slater’s constraint qualification. For
all i ∈ I, and z ∈ Rn, the function Ji(·, z) is continuously
differentiable and convex. 
B. Generalized aggregative equilibrium and strictly-monotone
pseudo-gradient mapping
Our aim is to design continuous-time, semi-decentralized,
dynamics that asymptotically converge to a generalized ag-
gregative equilibrium, which is a set of decision variables such
that each is optimal given the average among all the decision
variables and the coupling constraints.
Definition 1: Generalized aggregative equilibrium. A set
of decision variables x∗ = col (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
N ) ∈ X is a
generalized aggregative equilibrium of the game in (1) if, for
all i ∈ I,
x∗i ∈ argmin
y∈Ωi
Ji (y, avg(x
∗))
s.t. Aiy +
∑
j 6=iAjx
∗
j ≤ b. 
A fundamental mapping in game theory is the so-called
pseudo-subdifferential mapping, which in our setup with con-
tinuously differentiable functions, hence single-valued sub-
differentials, is a pseudo-gradient mapping. Since we are
interested in generalized aggregative equilibria, rather than
generalized Nash equilibria, together with semi-decentralized
equilibrium seeking dynamics, let us adopt the following
definition of (semi-extended) pseudo-gradient mapping:
F (x, σ) :=
[
col
(
(∇xiJi(xi, σ))i∈I
)
k (σ − avg(x))
]
, (2)
where k > 0 is a free design parameter, and σ is a control
variable. Throughout the paper, we assume that the pseudo-
gradient mapping in (2) is strictly monotone, see the discussion
in Section IV-A for sufficient conditions on the problem data.
Standing Assumption 2: Strictly-monotone pseudo-gradient
mapping. The pseudo-gradient mapping F in (2) is strictly
monotone on X × Rn, i.e., for all ξ, ζ ∈ X × Rn such that
ξ 6= ζ, 〈F (ξ)− F (ζ), ξ − ζ〉 > 0. 
It follows by the regularity of the problem data (Standing
Assumption 1) and by the strict monotonicity of the pseudo-
gradient mapping (Standing Assumption 2) that a generalized
aggregative equilibrium exists. The proof is analogous to that
of [4, Th. 2.3.3 (a)].
C. Operator-theoretic characterization
With the aim to decouple the coupling constraints of the
game, Ax ≤ b in (1), we adopt duality theory for equilibrium
problems. We start from the definition of the Lagrangian
functions, {Li}i∈I , one for each agent i ∈ I:
Li (xi,x−i, λi) := Ji(xi, avg(x)) + λi
⊤(Ax− b) , (3)
where λi is a dual variable. Then, for each i ∈ I, we introduce
the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) system:
∀i ∈ I :


0 = ∇xiJi(xi, σ) + ιΩi(xi) +A
⊤
i λi
0 = σ − avg(x)
0 ≤ λi ⊥ −(Ax− b) ≥ 0 ,
(4)
where {λi}i∈I are the dual variables, one vector for each
agent i ∈ I, associated with the coupling constraint, and
0 ≤ λi ⊥ −(Ax − b) ≥ 0 represents the complementar-
ity condition. Note that in (4), the first two equations are
equivalent to 0 = ∇xiJi(xi, avg(x)) + ιΩi (xi) + A
⊤
i λi. We
use the former formulation to recover a semi-decentralized
solution algorithm later on. Next, we follow the steps in [10]
and focus on the class of variational generalized aggregative
equilibria, i.e., generalized aggregative equilibria that satisfy
the KKT system in (4) with equal dual variables, λi = λ for all
i ∈ I. In our definition of variational generalized aggregative
equilibrium, the connection with the solutions to the KKT
system is inspired by [15, Th. 9, Def. 3]. We refer to [15, §5]
for the relevant properties of variational (generalized Nash)
equilibria.
Definition 2: Variational generalized aggregative equilib-
rium. A set of decision variables x∗ = col (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
N ) ∈ X
is a variational generalized aggregative equilibrium (v-GAE)
of the game in (1) if it is a GAE of the game in (1) and there
exists λ∗ ∈ Rm≥0 such that the triplet (x
∗, avg(x∗),1N ⊗ λ∗)
solves the KKT system in (4). 
Existence and uniqueness of the v-GAE follows by the
standing assumptions, due to the connection with variational
inequalities – the proof is analogous to [5, Prop. 12.11]. By
introducing the dual variable λ, we have extended the space of
the decision variables of the aggregative game. It then follows
that the extended version of the pseudo-gradient mapping,
Fext(x, σ, λ) :=
[
F (x, σ)
b
]
+

 0 0 A⊤0 0 0
−A 0 0



xσ
λ

 , (5)
has a fundamental role in the operator-theoretic characteriza-
tion of the equilibria. Specifically, we show in the following
that the solution of the KKT system is a zero of a (maximally)
monotone operator that contains the extended pseudo-gradient
mapping in (5) and that it generates a v-GAE.
Lemma 1: Operator-theoretic characterization. The follow-
ing statements are equivalent:
(i) x∗ is a v-GAE of the game in (1);
(ii) (x∗, avg(x∗), λ∗) ∈ zer
(
NΩ×Rn×Rm
≥0
+ Fext
)
, for some
λ∗ ∈ Rm≥0. 
Remark 1: Maximal monotonicity. The normal cone
NΩ×Rn×Rm
≥0
is maximally monotone [16, Ex. 20.26], Fext is
monotone and continuous, hence maximally monotone [16,
Cor. 20.28], and dom (Fext) = R
nN × Rn × Rm. Thus, the
sum operator NΩ×Rn×Rm
≥0
+ Fext in Lemma 1 is maximally
monotone as well [16, Cor. 25.5 (i)]. 
III. CONTINUOUS-TIME INTEGRAL DYNAMICS FOR
GENERALIZED AGGREGATIVE EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING
For asymptotically reaching the v-GNE, we consider the
following continuous-time integral dynamics:
∀i ∈ I : x˙i = ΠΩi
(
xi , −∇xiJi(xi, σ)−A
⊤
i λ
)
σ˙ = k (avg(x)− σ)
λ˙ = ΠRm
≥0
(λ,Ax− b) .
(6)
where k > 0 is a free parameter gain.
Equivalently, in collective projected-vector form, the dy-
namics in (6) read as
x˙σ˙
λ˙

 = ΠΩ×Rn×Rm
≥0



xσ
λ

 ,

−F (x, σ) +
[
−A⊤λ
0
]
Ax− b



 .
(7)
Remark 2: Semi-decentralized structure. The computation
and information exchange in (6) are semi-decentralized: each
agent performs decentralized computations, namely, projected-
pseudo-gradient steps, and does not exchange information with
other agents. A central control unit, which does not participate
in the game, collects aggregative information, avg(x(t)) and
Ax(t) − b, and broadcasts two signals, σ(t) and λ(t), to the
agents playing the aggregative game. In turn, the dynamics
of the broadcast signal σ(t) are driven by the average among
all the decision variables, avg(x(t)), while the dynamics of
the signal λ(t) are driven by the coupling-constraint violation,
Ax(t)− b. The semi-decentralized structure prevents that the
agents are imposed to exchange truthful information. 
First, we show that the x−part of an equilibrium for the
dynamics in (7) is a v-GAE, in view of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2: The following statements are equivalent:
(i)
(
x¯, σ¯, λ¯
)
is an equilibrium for the dynamics in (7);
(ii)
(
x¯, σ¯, λ¯
)
∈ zer
(
NΩ×Rn×Rm
≥0
+ Fext
)
. 
In view of Lemma 2, we can directly analyze the conver-
gence of the projected dynamics in (7) to an equilibrium. Let
us introduce a quadratic function, V , which is used later on
to obtain a Lyapunov function.
Lemma 3: Consider the function
V (x, σ, λ) := 12 ‖x−x
′‖
2
+ 12 ‖σ−σ
′‖
2
+ 12 ‖λ−λ
′‖
2
, (8)
where (x, σ, λ), (x′, σ′, λ′) are arbitrary vectors in Ω×Rn×
R
m
≥0. It holds that
V˙ (x, σ, λ) := ∇V (x, σ, λ)⊤
[
x˙
σ˙
λ˙
]
≤ ∇V (x, σ, λ)⊤

−F (x, σ) +
[
−A⊤λ
0
]
Ax− b

 ,
(9)
where
[
x˙
σ˙
λ˙
]
stands for the right-hand side in (7). 
We are now ready to establish our main global asymptotic
convergence result. The proof, given in Appendix A, is based
on invariance arguments for differential inclusions with max-
imal monotone set-valued right-hand side.
Theorem 1: Global asymptotic convergence to variational
generalized aggregative equilibrium. Let x∗ be the v-GAE of
the game in (1). For any initial condition (x0, σ0, λ0) ∈ Ω×
R
n × Rm≥0, there exists a unique solution to (7) starting from
(x0, σ0, λ0), which is a locally absolutely continuous function
satisfying (7) almost everywhere, remains in Ω×Rn×Rm≥0, is
bounded for all time, and converges to {x∗} × {avg (x∗)} ×
{λ}, a Lyapunov stable equilibrium of (7). 
IV. TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS
A. On the strict monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient
In this subsection, let us consider a separable structure for
the cost functions, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I : Ji(xi, σ) = fi(xi) + (Ciσ)
⊤ xi , (10)
for some convex functions {fi}i∈I and n × n matrices
{Ci}i∈I . The next result provides a sufficient condition on
the problem data such that the pseudo-gradient mapping F in
(2) is strictly monotone (Standing Assumption 2).
Proposition 1: Consider the aggregative game in (1) with
cost functions {Ji}i∈I as in (10). Assume that, for each
i ∈ I, the function fi is twice continuously differentiable
and µ−strongly convex in Ωi. The pseudo-gradient mapping
in (2) is strictly monotone if
min{µ, k} > 12
(
max
i∈I
‖Ci‖∞ +
k
N
)
. (11)

Proof: By (10), the pseudo-gradient mapping in (2) is
F (x, σ) = col
(
(∂fi(xi) + Ciσ)
N
i=1 , k(σ − avg(x))
)
,
hence its subdifferential reads as
∂F (x, σ) =


∂2f1(x1) C1
. . .
...
∂2fN (xN ) CN
− k
N
I · · · − k
N
I kI

 .
It follows from [4, Prop. 2.3.2] that the pseudo-gradient F is
strictly monotone if and only if its subdifferential is positive
semi-definite, i.e., since fi is µ−strongly convex,

µI 12
(
C1 −
k
N
I
)
. . .
...
µI 12
(
CN −
k
N
I
)
∗ · · · ∗ kI

 ≻ 0.
By the Gershgorin circle theorem, the latter is true if
min{µ, k} > 12 |ci,i −
k
N
| + 12
∑
j 6=i |ci,j |, which is implied
by (11).
The sufficient condition in (11) extends that in [1, Prop.
1] to the case of heterogeneous matrices {Ci}i∈I . In turn, it
is less restrictive than the sufficient condition in [17, Th. 2].
The inequality condition in (9) becomes less restrictive as N
grows, which is desirable for large number of agents [1, §IV].
B. On separable convex coupling constraints
Let us discuss the setup with separable, nonlinear yet
convex, coupling constraints, i.e., of the form
g(x) :=
∑N
i=1 gi(xi) ≤ 0 , (12)
where the functions {gi}i∈I are convex and continuously
differentiable, and the set {x | g(x) ≤ 0} is non-empty
and satisfies Slater’s constraint qualification. To recover affine
coupling constraints, the optimization problems of the agents
can be rewritten with auxiliary decision variables as
∀i ∈ I :


min
xi,yi
Ji (xi, avg(x))
s.t. (xi, yi) ∈ Ωi × Yi
gi(xi) ≤ yi∑N
j=1 yj ≤ 0 ,
(13)
where the set Yi ⊃ {gi(ξ) ∈ R
m | ξ ∈ Ωi} is compact
and convex. Now, if x∗ is the GAE of the original game
with coupling constraints as in (12), then the pair (x∗,y∗),
with y∗i = gi(x
∗
i ) for all i, is a GAE of the game in
(13). Conversely, let (x∗,y∗) be a GAE of the game in
(13). If the coupling constraint is inactive at the equilibrium,∑N
j=1 y
∗
j < 0, then it is unnecessary and x
∗ is a GAE of the
original game; if the coupling constraint is active, then
∀i ∈ I : (x∗i , y
∗
i ) ∈


argmin
xi,yi
Ji (xi, avg(x))
s.t. (xi, yi) ∈ Ωi × Yi
gi(xi) +
∑
j 6=i y
∗
j ≤ 0.
Therefore, the pair (x∗, (gi(x
∗
i ))i∈I) is a GAE of the game
in (13), and in turn x∗ is a GAE of the original game.
C. On generalized Nash equilibria
We recall that a Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies where
each is optimal given the other strategies, as formalized next.
Definition 3: Generalized Nash equilibrium. A set of deci-
sion variables x∗ = col (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
N ) ∈ X is a generalized
Nash equilibrium (GNE) of the game in (1) if, for all i ∈ I,
x∗i ∈ argmin
y∈Ωi
Ji
(
y, 1
N
y + 1
N
∑
j 6=i x
∗
j
)
s.t. Aiy +
∑
j 6=i Ajx
∗
j ≤ b. 
Remark 3: A GNE in Definition 3 differs from a GAE
in Definition 1, since in the latter, each decision variable is
optimal given the average among the decision variables of all
agents that enters as second argument of the cost functions. We
refer to [18], [19] for a comparison between aggregative/mean-
field equilibria and Nash equilibria. 
If we aim at computing a GNE, rather than a GAE, then
the definition of pseudo-gradient mapping shall be changed to
FN(x, σ) :=
[
col
((
∇xiJ1(xi, σ) +
1
N
∇σJi(xi, σ)
)N
i=1
)
k (σ − avg(x))
]
,
(14)
since, for each agent i, the variable xi enters as local decision
variable in both the first and the second argument of the
cost function Ji. Analogously to (7), possible continuous-time
generalized Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics are

x˙σ˙
λ˙

 = ΠΩ×Rn×Rm
≥0



xσ
λ

 ,

−FN(x, σ) +
[
−A⊤λ
0
]
Ax− b



 .
(15)
Convergence to a variational GNE (v-GNE) of the above
dynamics then follows if the pseudo-gradient mapping is
strictly monotone.
Corollary 1: Global asymptotic convergence to generalized
Nash equilibrium. Let x∗N be the v-GNE of the game in (1).
Assume that the mapping FN in (15) is strictly monotone on
Ω× Rn × Rm≥0. For any initial condition (x0, σ0, λ0) ∈ Ω×
R
n×Rm≥0, there exists a unique solution to (15) starting from
(x0, σ0, λ0), which is a locally absolutely continuous function
satisfying (7) almost everywhere, remains in Ω×Rn×Rm≥0, is
bounded for all time, and converges to {x∗N} × {avg (x
∗
N)}×
{λ}, a Lyapunov stable equilibrium of (15). 
Analogously to Proposition 1, in the case of separable cost
functions as in (10), we provide sufficient conditions on the
problem data such that the pseudo-gradient mapping FN in
(15) is strictly monotone.
Proposition 2: Consider the aggregative game in (1) with
cost functions {Ji}i∈I as in (10). Assume that, for each
i ∈ I, the function fi is twice continuously differentiable and
µ−strongly convex in Ωi. The mapping FN in (15) is strictly
monotone if
min{µ, k} > max
i∈I
1
2 ‖Ci‖∞ +
1
N
‖Ci‖1 +
1
2
k
N
. (16)

Proof: Since ∇xiJi(xi, σ) +
1
N
∇σJi(xi, σ) = ∂fi(xi) +
Ciσ +
1
N
C⊤i xi, by the proof of Proposition 1, we shall have

µI + 1
N
C⊤1
1
2
(
C1 −
k
N
I
)
. . .
...
µI + 1
N
C⊤N
1
2
(
CN −
k
N
I
)
∗ · · · ∗ kI

 ≻ 0.
Thus, by the Gershgorin circle theorem, the latter is true
if min{µ + 1
N
ci,i, k} >
1
N
∑
j 6=i |cj,i| +
1
2 |ci,i −
k
N
| +
1
2
∑
j 6=i |ci,j |, which is implied by (16).
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In aggregative games with affine coupling constraints,
continuous-time integral dynamics with semi-decentralized
computation and information exchange can ensure global
asymptotic convergence to generalized aggregative or Nash
equilibria, under mild regularity and strict monotonicity as-
sumptions. Future research will focus on continuous-time
distributed-averaged-integral dynamics in multi-agent network
games with coupling constraints.
APPENDIX A: PROOFS
For ease of notation, next, we use ξ := col(x, σ), ξ∗ :=
col(x∗, σ∗), ξ¯ := col(x¯, σ¯) and Ξ := Ω× Rn.
Proof of Lemma 1: Analogous to [5, Prop. 12.4], namely,
with F in (2), rather than FN in (14), see [10, Th. 1]. 
Proof of Lemma 2: By Moreau’s decomposition theorem,
0 = ΠΞ
(
ξ¯, −F (ξ¯) +
[
−A⊤λ¯
0
])
= −F (ξ¯, σ¯)+
[
−A⊤λ¯
0
]
−projNΩ×Rn (ξ¯)
(
−F (ξ¯) +
[
−A⊤λ¯
0
])
and 0 = ΠRm
≥0
(
λ¯, Ax¯− b
)
= Ax−b−projNRn
≥0
(λ¯) (Ax¯− b).
The proof then follows immediately. 
Proof of Lemma 3
The proof follows the steps of [11, Proof of Lemma 6].
Since ∇V (ξ, λ)⊤ = col (ξ − ξ′, λ− λ′)⊤, for all vectors u,
by Moreau’s decomposition theorem, we have that
(ξ − ξ′)
⊤
ΠΞ (ξ,−F (ξ) + u) =
(ξ − ξ′)
⊤
[
−F (ξ) + u − projNΞ(ξ)(−F (ξ) + u)
]
.
By definition of the normal cone NΞ(ξ), we have that
− (ξ − ξ′)
⊤
projNΞ(ξ)(−F (ξ) + u) ≤ 0,
and in turn
(ξ − ξ′)
⊤
ΠΞ (ξ,−F (ξ) + u) ≤ (ξ − ξ
′)
⊤
(−F (ξ) + u) .
(17)
With similar arguments, we can show that
(λ− λ′)
⊤
ΠRm
≥0
(λ,Ax− b) ≤ (λ− λ′)
⊤
(Ax− b) . (18)
The proof follows by summing up the inequalities in (17)
with u =
[
−A⊤λ
0
]
and (18). 
Proof of Theorem 1
The dynamics in (7) represent a projected dynamical system
with discontinuous right-hand side [20]. The proof uses in-
variance arguments for differential inclusions with maximally
monotone right-hand side [13]. First, we note that Fext in
(5) is continuous and monotone. Then, we consider a zero
of NΞ×Rm
≥0
+ Fext (Lemma 1), (ξ
∗, λ∗), and, bearing in
mind Lemma 3, define the Lyapunov function W (ξ, λ) :=
1
2 ‖ξ − ξ
∗‖2 + 12 ‖λ− λ
∗‖2. We show next that
∇W (z)⊤Fext(z
∗) =
[
ξ − ξ∗
λ− λ∗
]⊤
Fext(ξ
∗, λ∗) ≥ 0 (19)
for all z = (ξ, λ) ∈ Ξ× Rm≥0. By Lemma 1 and 2,
0 = ΠΞ
([
x∗
σ∗
]
, −F (x∗, σ∗) +
[
−A⊤λ∗
0
])
0 = ΠRm
≥0
(λ∗, Ax∗ − b) ,
(20)
therefore, we have 0 = −∇W (ξ, λ)⊤
[
ξ˙
λ˙
]∗
, where
[
ξ˙
λ˙
]∗
stands for the right-hand side of (20). By Lemma 3, we
immediately obtain (19):
0 = −∇W (ξ, λ)⊤
[
ξ˙
λ˙
]∗
≤ ∇W (ξ, λ)⊤Fext(ξ
∗, λ∗).
Consequently, we have that
∇W (z)⊤z˙ = −∇W (z)⊤Fext(z)
≤ −∇W (z)⊤[Fext(z)− Fext(z∗)] ≤ 0,
by the monotonicity of Fext. We conclude that W is not in-
creasing along the trajectories of (7). By radial unboundedness
of W , for any initial condition z0, the corresponding solution
is bounded and therefore the associated ω-limit set Λ(z0)
is non-empty, compact, invariant and attractive. Moreover,
by definition of the ω-limit set, W is constant on Λ(z0).
Thus, any solution ζ(·) with initial condition in Λ(z0) must
satisfy W˙ (ζ(t)) = 0, that is Λ(z0) is contained in the set
of points satisfying ∇W (z)⊤Fext(z) = 0. We then study
the set O =
{
z ∈ Ξ× Rm≥0 | ∇W (z)
⊤Fext(z) = 0
}
. For all
col(ξ, λ) ∈ O, it holds:
∇W (ξ, λ)⊤Fext(ξ, λ) =
[
ξ − ξ∗
λ− λ∗
]⊤
Fext(ξ, λ)
= (ξ − ξ∗)⊤
(
F (ξ) +
[
A⊤λ
0
])
− (λ− λ∗)⊤ (Ax− b) .
(21)
By Lemma 1, we have that Fext(ξ
∗, λ∗) +
[
v∗
0
]
= 0 for
some v∗ ∈ NΩ(x∗), hence F (ξ∗) +
[
A⊤λ∗
0
]
+
[
v∗
0
]
= 0 and
λ∗⊤(Ax∗ − b) = 0. Therefore, for all col(ξ, λ) ∈ O,
0 = (ξ − ξ∗)⊤
(
F (x, σ)− F (x∗, σ∗)−
[
v∗
0
]
+[
A⊤(λ− λ∗)
0
])
− (λ− λ∗)⊤ (Ax− b) . (22)
Now, we observe that (λ−λ∗)⊤ (Ax∗−b) =
λ⊤︸︷︷︸
≥0
(Ax∗−b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
−λ∗⊤ (Ax∗−b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
≤ 0 , and in turn
0 ≥
[
x− x∗
σ − σ∗
]⊤(
F (x, σ) − F (x∗, σ∗)−
[
v∗
0
]
+[
A⊤(λ− λ∗)
0
])
− (λ− λ∗)⊤A (x− x∗)
= (ξ − ξ∗)⊤
(
F (x, σ)− F (x∗, σ∗)−
[
v∗
0
])
≥ 0.
(23)
The last inequality holds because, by Standing Assumption 2,
(F (x, σ)− F (x∗, σ∗))⊤ (ξ − ξ∗) ≥ 0 and, by the definition
of normal cone, v∗⊤(x− x∗) ≤ 0. Thus, we obtain
(F (x, σ)− F (x∗, σ∗))⊤ (ξ − ξ∗) = v∗⊤(x−x∗) = 0. (24)
From (24), due to Standing Assumption 2, we con-
clude that x = x∗ and σ = σ∗ = avg(x∗). From
(22) and (24), we obtain 0 = (x− x∗)⊤A⊤ (λ− λ∗) −
(λ− λ∗)⊤ (Ax− b), hence λ⊤ (Ax∗ − b) = 0. The latter
implies (λ′ − λ)⊤ (Ax∗ − b) ≤ 0 for all λ′ ∈ Rm≥0, i.e.,
Ax∗− b ∈ NRm
≥0
(λ), or, equivalently, 0 = ΠRm
≥0
(λ,Ax∗− b).
The latter and the identity ξ = ξ∗ established before returns
that (ξ∗, λ) is a zero of NΞ×Rm
≥0
+Fext, hence an equilibrium
of (7), and this concludes the characterisation of O.
We finally show that convergence is to an equilibrium point
of (7). By Lemma 4 in Appendix B, the solution to (7) is the
same as the solution to −z˙ ∈ Fext(z) + NΞ×Rm
≥0
(z), where
the right-hand side of the differential inclusion is maximally
monotone by Remark 1. We can then apply [21, Ch. 3, Sec.
2, Th. 1], [13, Th. 2.2, (C1), (C3)], to conclude that every
equilibrium of (7) is Lyapunov stable and that, if the solution
has an ω-limit point at an equilibrium, then the solution
converges to that equilibrium. Now, from the arguments in
the first part of the proof, the non-empty and invariant ω-
limit set Λ(col (ξ0, λ0)) is contained in O. Since points of O
are equilibria of (7), then the ω-limit set Λ(col (ξ0, λ0)) is a
singleton with an equilibrium (ξ∗, λ) to which the solution
converges. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Corollary 1: Analogous to the proof of Theorem
1, namely, with FN in (14), in place of F in (2). 
APPENDIX B: PROJECTED DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS
We consider a generic projected dynamical system
z˙ = ΠK (z,−F (z)) (25)
where K ⊆ Rn is a non-empty, closed and convex set.
The dynamic behavior of (25) is well-studied for continuous,
hypomonotone mappings F .
Definition 4: Hypomonotonicity. A mapping F : Rn → Rn
is hypomonotone if there exists β ≥ 0 such that
(z − z′)⊤(F (z)− F (z′)) ≥ −β‖z − z′‖2
for all z, z′ ∈ Rn. 
In view of [14], [20], we recall next some equivalent
formulations of the projected dynamical system in (25).
Lemma 4 (from [14, Th. 1]): Let F in (25) be continuous
and hypomonotone. For any initial condition z0 ∈ K , the
differential inclusion
− z˙(t)
a.e.
∈ F (z(t)) +NK(z(t)). (26)
has a unique solution z(t) that belongs to K for almost all
t ≥ 0. Furthermore, the evolution variational inequality
z(t)
a.e.
∈ K, t ≥ 0, inf
v∈K
〈z˙(t) + F (z(t)), v − z(t)〉
a.e.
≥ 0 , (27)
and the projected dynamical system
z˙(t)
a.e.
= projTK(z(t))(−F (z(t))) = ΠK(z(t),−F (z(t)))
have the same solution as to (26). 
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